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' Sterne Court, Utah 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
DISPOSITION BELOW 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
ARGUMENT: 
UNDER THE FOURTH, FIFTH, AND SIXTH AMENDMENTS OF THE CONSTITUTI 
THE PLAINTIFF HAS THE RIGHT TO BE INFORMED OF THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF ACC 
CONTRONT WITNESSES AGAINST HIM, OBTAIN WITNESSES IN HIS FAVOR, NOT HAVE T 
PRESENT-EVIDENCE OR TESTIFY AGAINST HIMSELF, ENJOY A SPEEDY AND PUBLIC TR 
BY AN IMPARTIAL JURY (OR TRIBUNAL), OR TO STAND TRIAL ON THE SAME CHARGES 
THAN ONCE. DESPITE THESE CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES, THE PLAINTIFF HAS 
SUFFERED THE VIOLATIONS OF THESE RIGHTS AND PROTECTION UNDER THE STATE RU 
OF PROCEDURE, AND THEREFORE, THE PLAINTIFF SHOULD BE ABSOLVED OF ALL UNEM 
MENT COMPENSATION TAXES FOR WHICH HE IS BEING HELD LIABLE, p p ^ e . \ 
POINT £ 
THE ALJ'S FAILURE TO MAKE ADEQUATE FINDINGS OF FACT AND TO DEMOS 
AND OBJECTIVE, LEGAL ANALYSIS BEHIND HIS CONCLUSIONS C.BASED ON INADMISSABI 
EVIDENCE). 
LENDERS HIS DECISION UNREVIEWABLE AND LACKING IN SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE; Tt 
COMMISSION'S DECISIONS FAIL TO CURE THESE DEFECTS AND THEREFORE AS THE CEh 
•jOCUMENT SUBMITTED FOR EVIDENCE BE DECLARED NULL AND VOID, THE APPLICANT 
NEVER COMPLIED THE APPLICATION PROCESS, IS THEREFORE NOT A QUALIFIED, OF E 
APPLICANT, AND THEREFORE, THIS CASE SHOULD HAVE .NEVER BEEN BROUGHT FORWARI 
POINT 3 
UNDUE EFFORTS TO LEAD, INFLUENCE OF DIRECT THE CLAIMANT HAVE LEI 
TO CONCLUSIONS WHICH ARE POTENTIALLY FAULTY AND INAPPROPRIATE ' AND BY FAI] 
TO NOTE THE PREJUDICE AND AEVIOUS LOSS OF OBJECTIVITY ON THE PART OF THE 
ALJ, THE COMMISSION SEEMS TO ADMIT TESTIMONY WHICH AT BEST IS QUESTIONABLI 





TO DISCOURAGE ANYONE FROM BECOMING SELF-EMPLOYED, SELF-DIREC 
SELF-SUFFICIENT, OR AND INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR/ENTREPRENEUR IS IN DIK 
CONFLICT WITH THE SPIRIT, PURPOSE, AND INTENT OF THE UTAH EMPLOYMENT 
SECURITY ACT, THE HEALTH, MORALE, AND SOCIAL WELFARE OF THE CITIZENRY 
AND THEREFORE THE DECISION OF THE COMMISSION SHOULD BE REVERSED. 
T R G T E £7 
THE "C" PORTION OF THE EXCLUSIONARY "ABC" TEST DOES NOT HOLD 
IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO SATISFY. BECAUSE IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO SATISFY, IT CANNC 
AND BECAUSE THE PART IS FLAWED, THE WHOLE IS FLAWED. SINCE THE CASE AGAINST 
IS BASED ON A FLAWED TEST, HE CANNOT BE JUDGED TO NOT BE IN COMPLIANCE WITK 
AND .THEREFORE, MR.iROUSAY CANNOT BE HELD RESPONSIBLE FOR CONTRIBUTION'TO US 
BENEFITS. "V^CA£. 2 3 
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INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH, 
EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, and CECIL SILER, 
Defendants/ 
Respondents 
Case No. 860246 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal by plaintiff/appellant, alleged employer-petitic 
lichard Rousay (hereinafter appellant) controverting the decision of the Boa 
)f Review of the Industrial Commission of Utah which affirmed the decision c 
:he Administrative Law Judge (hereinafter, ALJ) holding services performed 
5V unemployment benefits claimant, Cecil P. Siler, and other solicitors and 
leliverymen (unidentified, and un-named) to constitute employment pursuant t 
3S35-4-22(j)(l), 35-4-22(j)(5) and 35-4-22(p), and the appellant, Richard Re 
:o be an employer, pursuant to S35-4-22(j).(l) , Utah Code Annotated 1953 as 
imended (Pocket Supplement 1983). 
\h 
Arguments of the plaintiff were heard by ALJ Kenneth A. Major. Frc 
e findings of fact, conclusions of law, and decision of the Tribunal afifim 
e Department's Decision Review Representative's decision, appellant filed <-
tion for review bv defendant/respondent Commission (hereinafter Commission: 
ie Commission adopted the findines of fact and conclusion of law of the AL, 
le plaintiff herebv appeals 'from the decision reeardins unemployment contril 
.ability set forth by the Commission. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellant seeks a reversal of the Commission's affirmation 
of the ALJ's findings of fact, conclusion of law and order, that the app( 
is liable for unemployment contributions for unemployment benefits to be 
paid to the claimant, Cecil P. Slier, or any other solicitors and delive: 
(unidentified and un-named); and that the substance and validity of the 
independent contactor's agreement be held to be valid and sufficient...in 
holding its signatories not within the scope of the Utah Employment Secu 
Act, and that the appellant not be held to be an employer, and Chat ..the 
Court issue an order barring further harrassment of the appellant by the 
Employment Security Division. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In October of 1981, Mr. Rousay, the appellant, initiated fund-
raising activities in the Salt Lake area under the dba, Aware Publications 
for and in behalf of charities and non-profit organizations. 
Throughout 1982, 1983, and 1984, Mr. Rousay was repeatedly called 
before the Industrial Commission on grounds that he had employed people 
and was not paying an unemployment contribution. Hearings by the Employmer 
Security Division charging the appellant as an employer and liable for 
unemployment contributions included the following: 
Alan Crabtree 9-22-82 
Kevin Lewis 6-24-82 
Steve Plum 6-23-83 
A. Stenbird 2-03-84 
John Wyman 2-03-84 
Dan Hardy 3-28-84 
In all of the above hearings, Mr. Rous 
was found not to be an employer within the meaning of the Unemployment 
Security Act. 
IC 
At the time of his initial discussion with Mr, Rousay, Mr. Siler 
reported that he had been working for P. C. C. Towing until February 17, 
1983, when he was terminated by a reduction in force. A few weeks later, 
Mr. Siler reported, he was able to sign a contract with Ute Cab Co. as 
a cab driver. Mr. Siler functioned as a cab driver at the time of his 
initial discussion with Mr. Rousay, and he continued to function in 
the capacity as a driver for Ute Cab Co. for 30.days. (Reported in his 
employment history (Exhibit 15 b, and 15 c) that he quit his job with 
Ute Cab on April 30, 1983, exactly one month after his first meeting with 
Mr. Rousay on 30 March 1983). 
In March of 1983, Mr. Cecil P. Siler, a retired fireman (USAF), 
and licensed vehicle operator, approached Mr. Rousay regarding an announce 
ment he had seen at the Employment Security Office which stated there was 
an opportunity for persons wanting a contract to deliver tickets and pick-
checks. Mr. Siler stated that he was attracted to the announcement becaus 
of the extremely flexible hours and that he was interested in an independe 
contractor relationship with Aware. 
Mr. Rousay asked Mr. Siler to document his intentions by complete 
a questionnaire. Mr. Siler completed the questionnaire stating that his 
view of an independent contract relationship was favorable (that he was 
in favor of it). Mr. Siler signed and dated his statement on March 30, 
1983. (Exhibit 13b, 0172). 
2 
On the day of his initial discussion with Mr. Rousay, Mr. Siler 
not sign an agreement. However, a general agreement was reached and 
Siler began making deliveries. On April 4, 1983, Mr. Siler was 
ted a license to conduct telephone solicitation in the City of Salt 
. (Exhibit 13E, 0173). The license fee ($10), cost of phones, 
option for those who requested it) were considered in the initial 
itiations for Mr. SilerTs share of the outcome.* 
By mutual agreement, Mr. Siler reQorded his deliveries and 
.citation outcomes on seperate forms and filed a an original or copy 
L Mr. Rousay so inventories on tickets and sales receipts could be 
>mplished by both parties. 
Ir. Siler later stated that he was unaware of ever paying for the 
le rental, yet he signed more than 20 affadavits in which he was 
Lfied that there was a fee of 5c per day, payable weekly. The 
mt of the percentage of the outcome is also indicated on same 
tract or agreement. Mr. Siler had his own phone at his residence, 
zh he also used for solicitation. However, he elected to use the 
les in Mr. RousayTs office at his own convenience. (See pages 
53, 111, and 112 of the transcripts. 
At no time did Mr. Rousay conduct training for Mr. Siler. The 
lication that there were classes, training aids, lectures, or evaluative 
dback on performance of Mr. Siler or anyone else who chose to use the 
ice, is not founded. 
3 
There was no "canned presentation" which had to be followed 
word for word. Rather, at the insistence of the Paramed Foundation, 
Mr. Rousay prepared his own presentation from the outline provided by 
the Paramed Foundation and then cleared his personal presentation with 
the Paramed Foundation. Contractors who wished to follow Mr. Rousay!s 
personal presentation, rather ;than follow the outline provided by the 
Paramed Foundation, were permitted to do so. Each solicitor was allowed— 
even encouragedto use their own discretion in developing their own presen-
tations so long as they stayed within the legal requirements of the 
Paramed Foundation, state and local ordinances for their solicitations. 
(See page 82, and 141). Mr. Rousay never monitored phone calls, or insist 
on practicing, or prescribed phraseology, specific terms, strategies or 
ploys to direct the contractors. They were encouraged to exercise their 
own judgement as entrepreneurs as to what was best for them. 
Mr. Siler already knew how to operate a telephone arc?, how to 
use a phone book and so he required no training.as a solicitor. He 
already had a chauffeur D license and was very well qualified as a 
vehicle operator and delivery contractor. 
Over a period of about five months, Mr. Siler continued to 
make solicitations and deliveries. Each week he signed a statement 
of understanding that: 
/f. 
Party of the First Part, and Aware Publications of the Second Part, 
hereby contract and agree as follows: 
The party of the first part hereby contract to sell advertising 
id/or tickets by telephone solicitation and/or collect money payable to 
le party of the second part at a fixed fee of ( SOME PERCENTAGE). 
It is understood by both parties hereto that the first party is 
3t an agency of Aware Publications, but has been engaged as an independent 
untractor to perform the function detailed above, and such function has 
sen completed shall have been fully performed. 
There will also be (a) 5c phone rental fee per day payable weekly 
y the independent contractor. (See 0176, and 059.) 
During the entire period, Mr. Siler continued to make deliveries 
sing his three vehicles. Mr. Siler paid his own fuel, lubrication, 
:une~ups and other maintenance expenses. He also used his own residence, 
3695 W. 700 E, Salt Lake City, as a mail drop. (Exhibit 13). 
At no time was Mr. Siler!s share in the outcome based on hour, 
day, week or month, but was completely dependent on his own creativity, 
ingenuity, and skill in efficiently soliciting and delivering. He remained 
completely at risk for all transactions. At times he drove as much as 
75-100 miles a day and was never restricted to a particular geographical 
area or time of day in which to conduct his business. (See 048, 059). 
5 
Mr. Siler was never hired, but was contracted. Mr. Siler was 
never terminated, or requested to discontinue his work of soliciting for 
the Paramed Foundation. Mr. Siler was never and employee and therefore 
Mr. Rousay made no deductions from his checks other than those specificall 
addressed in the agreement (for phone and license). As no wages were paid 
no taxes or contributions were deducted. (Exhibit 13 C, 0171). 
Mr. Siler!s visits to the office of Mr. Rousay became less and 
less frequent and by about September, 1983 Mr. Siler had virtually ceased 
all activity. 
On June 4, 1984 Cecil P. Siler contacted Virginia Byrd of the 
Employment Security and filed and signed Form 601, Claim for Unemployment 
Benefits (Exhibit 10). During this application, Mr. Siler testified, he 
was guided on how to complete Form 601 with regard to his "prior employmer 
(Transcrips 100-102). There is no evidence in the record that Ms Byrd 
conducted a thorough examination of Mr. Siler?s eligibility. (The ALJ 
later denied the appellant a subpoena of Employment Security Records 
dealing with the examination of Mr. Siler?s eligibility.) 
On June 8, 1984, Mr. Siler filed a Statement of Work and Wages 
in which he claimed tht he understood himself to be an employee of 
Mr. Rousay/Aware Publications (Exhibit 11). 
6 
On July 5, 1984, Mr. Evans filed a Status Questionnaire for 
:. Siler on which Mr. Evans forged Mr. Siler!s signature. (Exhibit 9) 
ie same day, Mr. Evans phoned the appellant and informed him that Mr. 
Ller had filed for unemployment benefits. Mr. Rousay expressed mild 
lrprise as he had not heard from Mr. Siler for several months. Mr. 
Dusay explained that Mr. Siler had functioned as an independent contractor 
id would not, as he understood it, qualify as a benefits recipient. 
On July 6, 1984, Mr. Evans called Mr. Rousay to request a copy 
f the independent contract agreement. 
On July 7, 1984, Mr. Evans phoned Mr. Rousay again and demanded 
he agreement be mailed to him stating that such an agreement was probably 
ot valid. (p. 35,094, 36, 095). Mr. Rousay challenged Mr. Evans1 conclusi< 
xplaining that after a hearing in 1982 before the Industrial Commission, 
x. Rousay had contact Wayne Clegg, of the Utah Industrial Commission, 
nd requested guidance on how to avoid further hassles with the Commission. 
[r. Clegg advised Mr. Rousay to have individuals sign a clear declaration 
>f their intent to function as independent contractors, and to have anyone 
7 
Lshing to use the phones pay a nominal fee. Mr. Rousay also explained 
iat Mr. Siler not only understood himself to be an independent contractor 
?. 55), but that he had clearly functioned as such. 
On July 10, Mr. Evans phone Mr. Rousay again to report that he 
ad received a copy of the Independent contractorTs agreement. 
On July 11, 1984 Mr. Evans phoned Mr. Rousay to inform him that 
e had found the Independent Contract null and void. 
On July 12, 1984, Mr. Evans again phoned Mr. Rousay. Mr. Evans 
tated thtat as far as he was concerned, .Mr. Cleggfs contribution to the 
greement was of no value and that he held Mr. Siler to be Mr. RousayTs 
mpluyee. 
On July 13, 1984, Mr. Evans phoned Mr. Rousay and demanded all 
if Mr. Rousay!s business records. Mr. Rousay replied that he saw no 
ustification for such a demand and asked Mr. Evans to stop calling him. 
On July 16, 1984, Mr. Evans again phoned Mr. Rousay and demanded 
:he records again. Mr. Rousay explained that he had been acquitted of such 
'charges11 before and asked Mr. Evans to put his request in writing or 
:o stop harassing him with calls. 
On July 17, 1984, Mr. Evans demanded to go to Mr. RousayTs 
Dffice and review all of Mr. Rousay!s private business records. Mr. 
Etousay again requested Mr. Evans to put his request and justification in 
writing and requested that Mr. Evans stop badgering him. 
& 
Several months passed. 
Then, on October 3, 1984, Richard Rousay received at his residence 
i Status De termination signed by Mr. Evans informing him that he "never 
registered with Job Service and never piad unemployment taxes on telephone 
solicitors" and that the Employment Security Act authorized investigations 
as to the status of applicants (specifically citing only Mr. Siler by name), 
iowever, Mr. Evans stated that the scope of the status determination was 
for "any and all" solicitors Mr. Rousay might have engaged at anytime. 
Without specifying how much tax was due for what "employees" 
md for what period, f*jr. Evans went on to outline arguments concerning 
Ir. Rousayfs failure to meet the ABC test, he suggested that Mr. Rousay 
:ile a Status eport, Employer's Contribution Report for Multiple Quarters, 
Application for Waiver of Penalty and informed Mr. Rousay that the decision 
was final that he was an employer unless Mr. Rousay filed an appeal. 
Mr. Rousay asked for extension fo 30 days. 
The extension was granted and Mr. Rousay filed a timely appeal 
for a Review Hearing. 
9 
The review hearing was held on February. 22, 1985 at Employment 
ecurity Offices. Peter Dietz, Decision Review Representative, without 
enefit of witnesses other than questionning briefly Mr. Rousay and Mr. 
vans, concluded that nThe individuals who provided solicitation or 
.elivery service are in employment except those who may be excluded 
inder Section 35-4-22(r).u Mr. Dietz made no effort to examine Mr. 
>ilerfs qualifications as a recipient of employee benefits. 
( Note: Developments after this date are well documented 
in the attached record. Please note the excessive 
number of requests the appellant was required to 
file with the clerk of the court before he could 
be granted an opportunity to file this brief.) 
io 
UNDER THE FOURTH, FIFTH, AND SIXTH AMENDMENTS OF THE CONSTITUTION, 
E PLAINTIFF HAS THE RIGHT TO BE INFORMED OF THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF ACCUSAT'. 
TCRONT WITNESSES AGAINST HIM, OBTAIN WITNESSES IN HIS FAVOR, NOT HAVE TO 
ESENT-EVIDENCE OR TESTIFY AGAINST HIMSELF, ENJOY A SPEEDY AND PUBLIC TRIAL 
AN IMPARTIAL JURY (OR TRIBUNAL), OR TO STAND TRIAL ON THE SAME CHARGES MOR] 
\N ONCE. DESPITE THESE CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES, THE PLAINTIFF HAS 
FFERED THE VIOLATIONS OF THESE RIGHTS AND PROTECTION UNDER THE STATE RULES 
PROCEDURE, AND THEREFORE, THE PLAINTIFF SHOULD BE ABSOLVED OF ALL UNEMPLOY-
ST COMPENSATION TAXES FOR WHICH HE IS BEING HELD LIABLE. 
The ruling of the Commission should be reversed and all alleged 
abilities for contribution against the appellant should be dismissed because 
numerous violations of the appellants rights. 
From the very beginning of this case the plaintiff has never had 
:lear declaration from the Respondants as to what is at stake. Mr. Rousay 
ted for such a declaration in writing several times and was never given a 
lav and specific statement as to the amount of taxes believed owed. Nor 
> the plaintiff been informed as to penalties due. Even as this case 
>s before the Supreme Court, the plaintiff has no idea of what amount may 
at risk. 
The language of the accusations or alleged liabilities has changed 
.r time. Originally, Mr. Siler was the only case to be brought before the 
>artment of Employment Security. Mr. Evans broadened the issue to include 
one else. Later, this group of "anyone'1 was narrowed to specify telephone 
icitors and deliverymen. Apparently, the Commission was not satisfied with 
evidence presented in Mr. SilerTs application, and embarked on a wild 
i \ 
ch for any evidence they could find. Despite having had ample time and 
urces to have subpoenaed anyone they wanted, the Commission was content 
ave only Mr. Siler testify. From Mr. Siler's testimony, the Commission 
then able to make sweeping generalizations about other alleged relationship 
aining to "all other solicitors and deliverymen." 
w^en Mr. Rousay was finally confronted with the testimony of the only 
.ess against him, Mr. Rousay asked for the subpoena of other witnesses and 
told he had missed his chance to bring them forward. The Plaintiff was 
denied the benefit of testimony of those who had advised him as to the 
imentation of the independent relationships he wished to develop. The 
did stipulate to the information provided by Mr. Rousay, but clearly 
.nished the value of the information in arriving at their conclusions. 
Mr. Rousay was harrassed to present evidence which might be used 
Lnst him. Several months before Mr. Rousay was informed of the specific 
ire of the investigation, and the general nature of the claim against him, 
Evans began a series of harrassing phone calls. Mr. Evans demanded 
troll, banking, and othergeneral records before stating forthrightly and 
writing what was at issue. 
The impartiality of the tribunal was called into question when Mr. 
say was denied the opportunity to bring forth additional evidence on his 
IS. 
half and was not permitted to continue the hearing to accomplish preparatior 
r cross examenation and response to Mr. Siler's testimony. From the 
cord it is abundantly evident that the Commission overlooked many discrepanc 
Mr. Siler's elegibility determination, and blunders on the part of the 
ployment Security Division (for which they were verbally chastised by the 
art.) Illustrative of this bias was the failure on the part of the Commissi 
question the ALJ's decision not to subpoena additional employment informati 
Mr. Siler, and the ALJ's declaration that Mr. Siler's elegibility was not 
Levant! Perhaps most damning was the Commission's acceptance of a status 
estionnaire (Exhibit 9) which had been completed by phone and later reversec 
em by item during cross examination, forged documents, and Mr. Siler's 
egibility despite Mr. Siler's self-declared entrepreneurial activities. 
The speediness of the trial is evidenced by (a) a delay of several 
ciths between the badgering phone calls and the formal response in writing 
Mr. Evans to the Plaintiff's request, (b) having to file some eleven 
planations and requests with the Clerk of the Court. 
To what degree the hearings were public is evidenced by the 
rivate" meeting which took place among the Respondants immediately 
ior to hearings of the ALJ. 
Though Mr. Rousay has been charged and found NOT liable for 
.employment compensation fund contributions on several prior occasions, 
ie Commission appears to not recognize these cases as relevant to the 
\"5 
rrent charges, or sufficiently different to not be in violation of the 
aintiff!s rights to not have to stand trial on the same charges more 
an once. Yet, without the slightest justification or argument in support 
auch a radical change in posture, the Commission turned completely around 
d broadened Mr. Siler's case to include all nother solicitors and delivery! 
ie conclusion here is that the Commission was not aware that Mr. RousayTs 
.ghts were being violated, or simply did not care. 
Violations in the Rules of Procedure ( F^ LUtfJrT- *0 X \ j 
iclude;issuance of subpoena without showing cause, 
ssuance of subpoena indicating the appellant had only 3 days to appear, 
tiereas the law provides for 5 days, technical errors in the transcripts, 
ailures to notify through registered mail, trying to open a case before the 
istrict Court when the issues were already before the Supreme Court, and 
ntering into evidence a document which may have been forged and which may 
<e in violation of the criminal states of the State of Utah. 
Taken as a whole, the Commission1s behavior in permitting this 
canton harrassment of the Plaintiff must be seen as less capricious and 
nore malicious. The element of fraud and deception on the part of the 
Respondants cannot be overlooked. On the one hand, the Claimant signed 
perhaps 20 affadavits or agreements indicating he considered himself, or 
14-
iderstood himself to be an independent agent and contractor, on the other, 
c. Silerhad no compunctions about filing for benefits. In the case of 
diibit 9, he first indicated the statements were true and accurate. The 
ame afternoon he systematically reversed every statement (or nearly 
yery statement) on the form, and admitted the signature on the bottom of 
tie form was not his own. 
In view of the violation of Mr. Rousay!s rights to a fair and 
mpartial hearing guaranteed under the U.S. Constitution and the rules 
f procedure of the State of Utah, shoddy investigation, wholesale 
eneralizations, broad, and unsustainable conclusions, and other systematic 
iolations, the Industrial Commission is clearly shown to have acted— 
it^  best, in an arbitrary and capricious fashion. 
(See pages 4,5,9,10, 11, 48, 58, 68, 71, and 72 of the Transcript 
15 
POINT 2. 
THE ALJTS FAILURE TO MAKE ADEQUATE FINDINGS OF FACT AND TO DEMOSTRA1 
) OBJECTIVE, LEGAL ANALYSIS BEHIND HIS CONCLUSIONS CEASED ON INADMISSABLE 
:DENCE) . 
FDERS HIS DECISION UNREVIEWABLE AND LACKING IN SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE; THE 
MISSION'S DECISIONS FAIL TO CURE THESE DEFECTS AND THEREFORE AS THE CENTRAI 
JUMENT SUBMITTED FOR EVIDENCE BE DECLARED NULL AND VOID, THE APPLICANT 
RER COMPLTED THE APPLICATION PROCESS, IS THEREFORE NOT A QUALIFIED, OF ELIG] 
>LICANT, AND THEREFORE, THIS CASE SHOULD HAVE NEVER BEEN BROUGHT FORWARD. 
Even a quick perusal of the ALJTs findings of fact and conclusions 
law and order shows that the conclusions are Bereft of any demonstrated 
jal analysis on the problems of the documents submitted, 
i findings of fact are merely a long recitation of evidence presented PRIOR 
cross examination. The ALJ makes no mention of the substantial, relevant 
Ldence of the events and circumstances surrounding Mr. Silers* evident self-
)loyment and completely independent activities. 
The fact that Mr. Siler claims to have amnesia doesnTt bother the 
spondents, Page 57 Transcripts- In its conclusion, the Commission fails 
note that Mr. Siler completely reversed himself on each point of Exhibit 9 
difficult cases where specifid details are unsure Cfor example, did Mr. 
Ler fabricate or construct details that he cannot remember?) it is resonabL 
c the Commission to convene a medical panel or to engage an expert witness. 
appears that the panel was unnecessary. The Commission was quite comfortal 
th a disparity in the facts, the ALJ merely proceeded to conduct a legal 
alysis of facts—as they construed them—prior to the reversal. 
According to the transcripts of testimony given at the hearing, Mr. 
.ler!s unemployment benefits were granted, largely, on the statements con-
lined ir/Exhibits 9, and 10J Mr. Siler, however, expained (pages 100", 101, 
id 102) that he had been instructed by Virginia Byrd, the Employment Securi 
zficer, originally responsible for eligibility determination, as to how to 
Dmplete the document. Mr. Siler says that he was instructed to declare the 
slationship to be one of an employer-employee relationship, rather than one 
E and independent relationship to hasten the processing and payment of Mr. 
ilerfs claim. 
These facts were clearly apparent to th.e ALJ, and yet the ALJ and 
ommission arbitrarily and caprici&usly refused to investigate this matter 
urther. Why was Mr. Siler1 s self-employment not considered? Why was he 
ermitted to establish eligibility without having to submit documentation 
hat he was not self-employed while acting as an independent contractor., 
age 55 Transcripts.^ (See also page 58 of the transcripts and Pugh v. 
airmount Gold and Silver Mining Co. 112 US 238, 28L ed 684, 5 SC 131., and 
illey v. Cook County, 103 US 155, 26, Led 374.) 
Had the respondants considered the importance af the reversal in 
he context of the background of the claimant, and his apparent willingness 
0 agree with anyone who wants to lead him, they would havetdtor^disregard 
tis earlier testimony, his applications, and alleged statements in favor of 
1 more direct approach in which they woiii take his present understanding of 
•he situation at face value. 
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ally, at a point where the matter might haye been salyaged with, a-modicum 
objectivity, the ALJ refused to allowrthe Appellent to subpoena relevant 
ords and witnesses (page 6~&} at a point where ther full scope of the Commis 
loyment SecurityTs allegations were beginning to become clear for the first 
From these and the many other arguments to be presented here, it can be 
wn without the slightest aquivocation, that the decisions of the ALJ and 
mission, are completely* inapnropriate and prcedurally inadequate, failing 
support their ultimate conclusions wittrrfacts, lacking a sound foundation 
per legal analysis, and ultimately rendering decisions* that would establish 
ompletely unacceptable precedent whereby anyone, even of questionable 
gibility, might be granted benefits, and be legally coached and guided in 
process! Exhibit 10. (Montgomery v. Industrial Comm. 436" P2d 621 Ariz App 
ie> 
POINT 3 
UNDUE EFFORTS TO LEAD, INFLUENCE OF DIRECT THE CLAIMANT HAVE LED 
CONCLUSIONS WHICH ARE POTENTIALLY FAULTY AND INAPPROPRIATE, AND BY FAILING 
IOTE THE PREJUDICE AND ABVIOUS LOSS OF OBJECTIVITY ON THE PART OF THE 
, THE COMMISSION SEEMS TO ADMIT TESTIMONY WHICH AT BEST IS QUESTIONABLE, 
AT WORST DELIBERATE COLLUSION AND ATTEMPTS TO UNLAWFULLY LEAD THE WITNESS, 
FORGED EXHIBIT 
Evans completed and signed Mr. Silers name of the Status Questionnaire. 
Lbit 9. 
The falsification and fraiiddlent signature by Mr. Evans to the only 
lment in the possession of the State in which. Mr. Siler allegedly reported 
self to be an employee and not an independent contractor. Mr. Evans states 
ihe transcripts , Page 9, line 4, that he (Mr. Evans) had him (Mr. Siler) 
)lete a Status Questionnaire. Transcripts page 72. Mr. Evans states that 
Status Questionnaire was filled out on the telephone by himself (Mr. Evans) 
Evans sstates on page 21 and 22, that an omission on Question 1 of the 
Lus Questionnaire was an omission on Mr. Siler1s behalf. Yet Mr. Evans 
lis own handwriting filled out and signed, Exhibit 9. How can this be? 
omission is on Mr. Evanrs behalf as Mr. Evans filed out and signed Exhibit 
Ln, Mr,.Evans states that he filled out Exhibit 9. Transcripts page 54. 
Mr. Evans in the discharge of his duties imposed by the Utah Employme 
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CONSPIRACY TO UNLAWFULLY LEAD WITNESS 
Mr. Evans, Mrs. Thompson, and Mr. Siler had a private meetings prior 
the hearing on October 9, 1985. 
Mr. Evans, Mrs. Thompson, and Mr. Siler had a private meeting and 
haps Mr. Major ALJ was also present. ( Transcripts, page 100). 
Under cross examination, Mr. Rousay asked about the meeting, 
anscripts, page 99.) Mrs Thompson!s response was to ask if she was a 
ness and evade answering the question. Mr. Major knew about the private 
ting. (Traifcripts, page 100.) And also Mr. Siler when questioned about the 
ting he also evaded the question.- Mr. Rousay continues to question about 
meeting prior to the hearing on October 9, 1985. Mr. Major interceded tha 
doesn't see any relevance to Mr. Rousay's questions. 
*"Cl am respectfully requesting that as part of my brief that the 
ler set of transcripts of the private meeting be included, (transcripts, pag 
f7) as these are records deemed necessary as evidence in connection with a 
sputed matter, or the administration of this act. (35 4 llh,. U. S. Strombei 
Costello, D. C. Mass 456F Supp 848.) and (N. Y. Silverman v. UFA Eastern Di^ 
3t Inc. 236, 18 135, Misc. 814.) 
Zo 
purity Act 35-4-llhand i. Mr. Evans is guilty of making false statements 
der oath. He is also auilty under Utah Criminal Code 76-8-101, 76-6-503, 
-8-414, 76-8-511, and 76-8-412. So blatant is this onslaught against Mr. 
usay by Mr..Evans that this case should have never been brought forth. 
This case deserves the full attention of the Federal Government as 
is a classical illustration of a deliberate fraud, and the systematic violc 
Mr. Rousay!s Civil Rights by a State Employee,. (Mr. Terry Evans). 
PERJURY FOR MONETARY GAIN 
Mrs. Virginia Byrd, an employee of the Industrial Commission of 
ah instructed Mr. Siler to fill out his Unemployment Compensation Form 
i to list (Aware Crime Stopppers) Mr. Rousay as an employer. 
Mr. Siler was instructed to change his relationship with Mr. 
jsay, to that of employee-employer, rather than as Mr. Siler believed 
be that of an independent contractor relationship. (Exhibit 10. Transcript 
ies 101, 102, and 100) Mr. Siler felt he was in fact an independent 
itractor under a written contract. Transcripts,pages 51, and 55.) The 
nages resulting in this action being brought against Mr. Rousay and Mr. 
ler being awarded his benefits for which he was not entitled to receive. 
. S. Gonsouland v. Rosomano CCA. LA 176F 481 100 C.C.C.A.) 
2\ 
In line with Godsol V. Michigan Unemployment Compensation Comm. 
102, Mich, 652, 5. N. W. 2d 519 (1942); Kaspera v.-Unemployment Compensatic 
Soard of Rev. 178 Pa S. 508, 116 A 2d 238 (1955); Battaglia v. Board of 
teview, 14 N.J.S. 24, 81 A. 2d 186 (1951), and Singer Sewing Machine Co. 
r. Industrial Comm. 104 Utah 175, 134 P. 2d 479 (1949), the stated purpose 
md intent of the Act is to assure that society is benefitted by the fruits 
)f human activity or work and that individuals are encouraged to sustain 
:hemselves. Even when the ability of the individual is limited, the 
virtue of seeking to find or create work, and thereby striving to maintain 
a. semblance of self-worth and dignity is both psychologically healthy and 
socially commendable. In contrast, to resign from such efforts, or to 
discourage these efforts fosters a sense of impotence, dependence and 
sloth. 
It would appear, therefore, that when individuals are rewarded 
jy their own efforts, and encouraged to be self-sufficient, (not coddled) 
Ln striving to support themselves and their dependents economically, the 
Dest interests of society are served. This encouragement of self-
sufficiency and independence is clearly the intent of Section 35-4-22 (1) 
and Laws, 1936 Special Session, c. 1. 1937, c. 43, in which the health 
and welfare of the worker is considered foremost. Indeed, the very 
purpose of the Commission is in complete harmony with the social and moral 
principles of economic growth and development through entrepreneurialism. 
22. 
Unfortunately, the Commission has ruled in the extant case that 
the appellant is an employer. The facts clearly point to an intent on the 
part of the plaintiff and the claimant that they wished an independent 
relationship. (Exhibit 13 d, 0172, and pages 51, 0110; 56, 0115; 65, 0124, 
The Commission's ruling, therefore, would appear to discriminate against 
the appellant by making Aware Publications liable for unemployment benefits 
contributions, while coddeling the applicant. 
The purpose and intent of the Act is violated by the Commission 
ruling in the extant case because the spirit and intent of entrepreneurial 
the drive for independence, and the free and unfettered enjoyment of the 
benefits of the fruits of their own efforts is dampened. Mr. Siler, havin] 
obtained an opportunity to enjoy potential returns on delivery and solicit 
he behaved as any entrepreneur might, and quickly set about passing this 
opportunity to others. In pursuing his entrepreneurial goals as a self-
declared independent contractor, he hired, fired and managed his own emplo 
unit. The fact that he was only marginally successful is further evidence 
that he was at risk. He was able, nevertheless, to demonstrate that he 
not only had the intent (Exhibit 13d) but the desire and capacity to under 
self-directed, independent entrepreneurial activity. 
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By ruling that Mr, Siler was an employee of Mr. Rousay, the 
ommission would foster a sense of impotence, dependence, and irresponsi-
ility which would diminish the self-esteem and morale of individuals 
ad open .the doors to thousands of other applicants, who upon obtaining 
ess profits from their activities than they thought they deserved, and 
ermit them to turn to the State for relief. In the process, the State 
ould, by neccessity, have to comple others, the successful entrepreneurs, 
r tax payers, to support them. Anyone who xcished to self-terminate 
heir employment or quit trying would become eligible for benefits, 
his, of course, would have a dire impact upon an already strained state 
conomy. 
In contrast to the conclusions of the Commission in this case, 
he Act should be construed and administered in such a way as to achieve 
he intended social purposes of the Act. (U.C.A. 1953, 35-1-1 et seq,, 
nd 35-4-1 et seq.) One who engages in self-employment within the meaning 
f the Act, for example, should not be permitted to enjoy a position of 
re^minence over other businessmen who are discriminated against. To 
avor one, less successful self-employment enterprise, to the disadvantage 
f another is unjustand contrary to the intended social purposes of the 
kct. (U.C.A. 1953, 35-4-1, 2) 
£4-
In Section5 (c) , supra, the Commission is directed to return 
self-employed individuals to return to their self-employment. The Commiss 
routinely rules that the Legislature did not consider self-employed indivi 
to be unemployed. The Michigan and Pennsylvania cour^ have properly ruled 
that self-employed individuals are not entitled to benefits even though th 
are available for work elsewhere as !!employees.n It would follow, then, 
that any individual suchas the claimant, engages in enterprise for a profd 
he becomes ineligible for unemployment compensation benefits when he elect 
to cease such activities in pursuit of his own self-interest. 
Mr, Siler was not terminated by Mr. Rousay, the appellant. In 
fact, Mr. Siler never formally gave notipe that he had quit. He merely 
ceased functioning as an entrepreneur, (See page 64, 0123) insofar as his 
work with Aware Publications and the Paramed Foundation were concerned. 
From the record, it is clear that Mr. Rousay could not have easily blocked 
Mr. Siler from engaging in entrepreneurial activity in direct association 
with the Paramed Foundation—even if he had wanted to, because the claimar 
was free to come and go as he wished, and was, therefore, free to select 
and develop opportunities for profit at his own leisure. 
Because Mr. Siler was free and independent, he was self-employed, 
therefore, he could not be rightfully self-unemployed. When free, indepei 
and self-employed, he is rightfully deemed to always be in a position to 
further his profitagle pursuits, or business, and therefore cannot be 
considered eligible for unemployment benefits. To grant the claimant ben 
violates the spirit and intent of the Act, and should, therefore, not. be 
permitted. £ _) 
Kaiser Steel Corp, v. Monfredi, 631, Utah 1981} clearly established that 
decision of the ALJ and the Industrial Commission may overturned where 
lings are arbitrary ot capricious, or not supported by "substantial" 
Liable evidence. The evidence required to support the Commissions 
dings has to.be more than a smattering of facts and allegations. The 
us trial Commission may not accept evidence or arguments in support of its 
elusions a "reasonable mind" might not accept, (Consolidated Edison Co. 
S. 197, 229 (1938). 
is, it can be shown that the ALJ acted in an arbitrary and capricioas mannc 
allowing questionable, even fraudulent information, Exhibit 9, uponn which 
base its conclusions. The ALJ compounded this error by erroneously extend: 
i argu ments beyond the facts in the case to include other alleged employee 
Lationships (Page 1) which had already been adjudged to the contrary. 
POINT ^ 
TO DISCOURAGE ANYONE FROM BECOMING SELF-EMPLOYED, SELF-DIRECTED, 
SELF-SUFFICIENT, OR AND INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR/ENTREPRENEUR IS IN DIRECT 
CONFLICT WITH THE SPIRIT, PURPOSE, AND INTENT OF THE UTAH EMPLOYMENT 
SECURITY ACT, THE HEALTH, MORALE, AND SOCIAL WELFARE OF THE CITIZENRY, 
AND THEREFORE THE DECISION OF THE COMMISSION SHOULD BE REVERSED. 
The Commission's findings and decision should be*Overturned 
where the health, morale, and social welfare of the citizenry is jeopardize 
by their conclusions .and is in conflict with the spirit, purpose, and inter 
of the Utah Employment Security Act, (hereinafter referred to as the Act.) 
The Act states that the intent of the Act is to assure that the 
society as a whole is benefitted by the fruits of labor and that society, 
as a whole, is benefitted when the members of society sustain themselves. 
The Commission, in fact, "with the advice and aid of its advisory councils 
shall take all appropriate steps to reduce/and prevent unemployment...M 
(S 35-4-11 (f)). These responsibilities include; "to promote the creation 
and development of job opportunities...", and to "plan, coordinate, 
organize or direct economic development programs as are deemed necessary 
to maintain or create job opportunities,..." and to "accomplish these 
purposes, the commission may enter into agreements with governmental or 
other agencies." (Op. cit.) rvn 
The Commission, therefore, has the express charter to create 
)bs. The Act addresses both forms of job creation: (1) entrepreneurial 
:tivity, or business, and (2) government spending. The promotion, creation 
id development of job opportunities, would therefore include the fostering 
entrepreneurialism. 
According to Paul A. Samuelson, professor of economics, Massachuseti 
istitute of Technology, an entrepreneur is one who peers into the future 
3 decide whether there will be demand for a service or commodity, and then 
isks capital to produce a product or service to meet the demand. Samuelson 
istinguishes him from the bureaucratic executive who simply keeps establis! 
isiness or activities functioning. Joseph Schumpeter, of Harvard, among 
any other economists do NOT think of profit ais the wages of managers, but 
s the return to entrepreneurs. As economists have observed, all true 
rofit is linked with uncertainty and risk. Over the long run excessive 
rofits and risk-taking is dampened.by the development of competitors who 
ventually enter into the market. (Frank H. Knight, Risk, Uncertainty and 
rofit, London School of Economics and Political Science, Series of Reprints 
f scarce tracts, No. 16, 1933). Therefore, it is the duty and responsibili 
if the Commission to foster and encourage entrepreneurial activity which 
creates profits, which creates jobs, which creates more profits, which 
iltimately attracts competitors, which eventually controls excessive profits 
md risk-taking. The net effect of facilitating this process is the achiev< 
aent of the goals and purposes of the Act. 
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THE f,C" PORTION OF THE EXCLUSIONARY "ABC" TEST DOES NOT HOLD BECAU! 
IMPOSSIBLE TO SATISFY. BECAUSE IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO SATISFY, IT CANNOT DIS< 
ECAUSE THE PART IS FLAWED, THE WHOLE IS FLAWED. SINCE THE CASE AGAINST MR. ] 
SED ON A FLAWED TEST, HE CANNOT BE JUDGED TO NOT BE IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE r 
HEREFORE, MR.iROUSAY CANNOT BE HELD RESPONSIBLE FOR CONTRIBUTION TO UNEMPLO^ 
ITS. 
The Commission has concluded that to fail "only one portion of the 
test is sufficient to deny independent status to a contractor. Alternativ 
Commission would argue that all three of the portions of the test must be 
or the contractorTs independence must be denied. 
Herein lies a major problem. For example, by the Commission's 
ming, it is impossible for one to start out as an independent contractor. 
nClf for example, requires the individuals performing the services for a 
ract to be "customarily engaged in an independent established trade, 
less, etc. of the same nature as involved in the contract for service." 
a customarily engaged requires a pattern or history of such activities. 
zan one establish an historical pattern if there is no history? Since 
lovice entrepreneur has no prior history of trade or business, how can he 
tie be engaged in a service is customary? Therefore, it is impossible for 
wishing to enter business to start out as an independent contractor with 
story 6r custom of contracting. (f ^-A 
Since the "C" portion of the testleads us to this absurdity, an 
Lnce all portions of the ABC test are sufficient to determine illegibility 
>r independent contractor status, the "ABC" test is absurd. It's very inten 
:rength is, in reality, an absurdity. 
If we were to throw out the "C" portion, we must surely throw 
it the rest because the Act states that the nC" portion, as the other portic 
re necessary to determine eligibility. Therefore, if we throw out the "C" 
Drtion, we must also discard the "A" and "B" portions as well. To conclude 
therwise would mean that the "Cff portion was never essential in the first p." 
The "B" test also hag. problems, the way the Commission has 
Interpreted it. The Commission has stated that the ,!BM test "requires 
:he services (of the contracted individual, or unit) "to be outside the 
jsual course of business OR outside the place of business." 
If the contractor meets only one of these criteria (to be 
ouside the PLACE of business, for example) the contractor presumably meets 
the "B" test. Take the case of a telephone solicitor. When a solicitor 
places a phone call from one telephone instrument to another phone instrume 
many miles away, the issue of location is obscured. Is the location of the 
call the site at which the caller is physically located, the terminal at wb 
the telephone switch is electronically connected, or the site at which the 
person responding to the call is located? Is the "work" or "service" 
accomplished in the mind of the recipient, or somewhere in the vast reaches 
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This case bears no similarity to the case of the part time employee 
10 because of seasonality or other factors has been reduced from full-time 
)urs to several hours per week. Mr. Siler, by his own admission, merely 
^andoned his own business. That the work remained is evidenced by Mr. Rousa 
mtinued efforts and success in conducting solicitation and arranging his »ow 
slivery. 
Mr. Siler could have expended considerable effort before making a s 
tius he might have expended considerable effort before receiving a profit on 
is efforts. So long as the claimant remained in a position to direct his ow 
ctivities, and to continue deliveries and solicitations at his own time 
nd place .of choosing, he remains self-employed, and therefore, it is not pos 
or him to have any week of less than full employment, (pages 52, and 0111). 
alph E. Child v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 8873 Utah., Dec. 1958. 
Even if it could be argued that Mr. Siler became "unemployed" 
s a result of his cessation of activities with Aware/Paramed, he would not 
ialify for benefits. 
In the landmark case of Ralph E. Child, manager and supervisor 
E Ralph Child Construction Company, Mr. Child filed for unemployment 
Dmpensation benefits when he was terminated by others in the firm and 
Lscharged as manager and supervisor. 
"The court well knows that these responsibilities (manager vs. 
Eficer and director) are not the same. The court found that the only 
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an employee who is also an officer, can recover unemployment compensation 
d be under the circumstance wherein the corporation was dissolved. 
Child argued it is only fair and consistent to pay unemployment 
ensation when the same person is employed as an employee, eventhough 
s unemployed as an officer. 
The fact that Mr. Siler chose to nlay himself off" as office 
.ger, a title which he invented, without salary or remuneration did not 
him less self-employed,;but more self-employed. 
At-any point Mr. Siler could be found to make collections, file 
own tax returns, sign necessary checks in payment for his own expense?, 
ige and service his vehicles, (pages 58, 59, 0117,0118) and perform 
aal functions associated with his delivery and solicitation activities, 
re were no records of submitting for reimbursement for expenses. There 
* no expenses to Kg**. Rousay for those activities undertaken by Mr. Siler 
which Mr. Siler did not freely and of his own volition, obligate himself. 
So long as Mr. Siler had the full authority to hire and fire his 
employees, conduct business as he saw fit, and had no restrictions on 
much time or effort or resources he directed to making a percentage or 
fit of the income, (pages 49, 0108) he was, and even remains to this day, 
ly employed. 
would seem reasonable that Mr. Rousay would no longer feel responsible to 
old his end of the bargain, and would no longer feel obligated to uphold 
y agreement for share of the profits generated by their conjoint efforts to 
at point. Now having declared himself to be an employee, he would justly 
ceive only those portions of the income generated alloted to the employee. 
is would presumably be a smaller percentage. Therefore, if the appellant 
re to be held liable for unemployment tax contributions, and had already 
id this portion to the claimant, it would be reasonable for the appellant tc 
te for recovery of any portion which might have covered his tax contributions 
ds would merely foster more litigation, and fail to benefit the employee 
ie Act was intended to protect. 
The A test is difficult to apply in this case. Control and 
.rection are clearly a matter of degree. As the record indicates, Mr. 
,ler exercised more control and direction (hiring, firing) than Mr. Rousay 
cercised over Mr. Siler. Since the usual "master and servant11 arguements 
)n!t fit the facts the the case, (e.g. when Rousay was acting as servant 
id Siler was acting as master) the test does not seem particularly applicabl 
lis, of course is exactly what one would expect to find in a situation where 
:>th parties had agreed to function in a mutually beneficial fashion without 
ie encumberances of the need to establish who is master and who is servant. 
Mr. Siler did not require training on how to use the phone, make 
Dlicitations (other than to observe at his own leisure how Mr. Rousay did 
is) and yet, through what appears to be undue influence, Mr. Siler is led 
y counsel for the respondants to state that he was trained by the appellant 
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.39). Despite Mr. Rousay's efforts to object, the judge did not permit a 
oss examination on this specific point until later. During cross, Mr. 
ler then reversed his statements implying control and clearly indicated he 
ew himself not to be under the control and direction of the plaintiff, 
gs 52,53,54,55, and 56 of the transcripts.) 
Suppose, for example, that a business transaction takes place by 
lephone. Is the locus of the transaction the phone of the seller, the 
yer, or somewhere in between? Does the medium of the exchange become the 
iteria by which we detrmine the nplace of business of the enterprises for 
ich the services are performed?'1 (Section 35-4-22) 
Until it can be shown that the accession of an instrument of 
nmunication on the premises of another individual would place the 
cformance of the business within (not outside) of all places of business 
are the call was made, virtually anyone with a phone would be at risk in 
:oming an employer. One of the arguments for not holding the phone owner 
sponsible is that the call was only incidental or flcasualn and that 
i phone ownerfs organization could not be construed to be an employment 
Lt. (Logan-Cache Knitting Mills v. Industrial Comm. , 99 Utah 1, 102 
Id 495. Yet, the Industrial Commission has failed to make a sound 
lment to address such problems in the extant case. Indeed, the claimant, 
the appellant, appears to better meet the requirements of an employing 
It, and would, therefore, as easily fail to meet the ABC tests in his 
.ationships as the plaintiff. 
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The appellant did not accept the claimant as an employee, but 
r as an independent agent. Therefore, the representations of the claimant 
i the basis of subsequent actions. Mr. Rousay permitted Mr. Siler to use 
Les in Mr. Rousayfs office based on the understanding that Mr. Siler 
acting as an independent agent. Had Mr. Siler, for example, informed 
Rousay that he intended to file for unemployment benefits, their relationsh 
Lt have been severely altered, and their sharing and collaboration terminate 
:e it would have placed Mr. Rousay in an untenable position. Yet, when the 
jnant filed for unemployment benefits at a later date, he effectively violat 
expressed intent of the multiple agreements signed by the claimant. 
McMaster v. Ford Motor Co. 122 SC 244, 115 SE 244, 29 ALR 230). In fact 
he right to contract is clearly absolute. Although the court may interfere 
o prevent its exercise in an unreasonable or patently oppressive manner 
Southern R. Co v. Chambers 126 Ga 404, 55 SE 37), the burden of the proof 
o set aside the contract is on the State. None of the above requirements 
re met in the instant case. Mr. Siler and Mr. Rousay engaged in a reasonab. 
utually beneficial arrangement with the declared preference for an 
ndependent relationship. (P. 100, 101, 102). 
That their intent was valid and supported by their subsequent 
ehavior is beyond question. For example, Mr. Rousay never arranged for 
eductions for Mr. SilerTs social security taxes, or assumed any other 
uties normally accomplished by an employer. In Cal-Argonaut Ins. Exchange 
Industrial Ace. Commission, CA 293 P. 2d 874, for example, the failure 
3S 
to withold federal income taxes was. cited as evidence of there being 
ao employment relationship. Other caes such as (i.e. Wilson v. Kelleher 
totor Freight Lines, 96 A 2d 531, 12 NJ 261, and Scholz v. Industrial 
Commission 64 N . W. 2 d 204, 267 Eis 31, and rehearing denied, 65 NW 
2dl, 267 Wis, 31) clearly support the notion that the alleged employers 
failure to withold payroll taxes was evidence that the relationship 
vas independent, and not an employer-employee relationship. In 
sfew Independent Tobacco Warehouse No 3, v. Latham, 282 S. W. 2d, 846, 
:he Court concluded that the business relation was that of independent 
:ontractor rather than an employee-employer and that the definition of 
m "employee11 under the Act was not-met. For these reasons alone, it 
tfould appear that Mr. Rousay clearly did not perceive Mr. Siler to be 
m employee. Mr. Siler, on the other hand, in noting that nothing 
;as withheld from his share of the profits, could only reasonably conclude 
:hat he was responsible for those contributions himself. 
The Commission argues that signing the declai^tion of their 
ependent contractor status is without merit* The Commission argues that 
ch contracts11 are null and void because an indiidual may not waive any 
hts .to unemployment insurance benefits by sienine any independent contract 
eement. 
The Commission f u r t h e r a s s e r t s that such agreements would be bind: 
unemployment insurance mat te rs l fif the serv ice re la t ionsKip meets the 
. lusioary "ABC". 
3& 
The clear intent of Section 35-4-18(a) is to preclude the 
oyer from taking unfair advantage of the employee by coercing the 
.oyee to sign an agreement waiving his rights to benefits so that the 
.oyee might enjoy the status of employee. The concern here is that the emp 
Lt exercise unfair influence over the employee. 
Note that the law does not state "prospective" employee. Before an 
Loyee is hired, they are an applicant. They do not obtain employment 
:us until there has been an exchange of commitments or an agreement to compe 
Commission failed to note that Mr. Siler declared his intention to work 
an indepdnent contractor before he signed an agreement for a percentage 
the outcome. Mr. Siler did not wiave his rights as an employee because 
tfas already self-employed by his own declaration. 
The Commission is wrong in asserting that such an agreement would 
binding only if the service relationship meets the exclusionary ABB test . 
in, the State seems to argue that two consenting adults cannot enter into 
eements without meeting a test that is so broad as to virtually always 
ablish an employee-employer relationship. Taken far enough the Commission 
soning would not permit anyone to go into business for the first time 
ressing the i32 ABC test. 
3T A 
:ween the caller*s phone and the recipientfs handset? Since the caller 
iches the prospect by dialing a number corresponding to an address in a pho 
)k, all that is essential for the transaction, or passage of information to 
:ur, is the physical transmission of bits of electronic information, to the 
:ipient. In fact, the signal cannot be acted upon until it is physically 
lifest at the recipientTs address. Therefore, a completed call, by definit 
ces places as much at the receiver1s end as it does the sender1s. Otherwis 
i call would not be completed, and the service could not be rendered. Sine 
Licitor!s service is rendered at the site of the recipient!s instrument, t 
Ll!s destination is the place at which the business takes place. 
Since the caller dials "out", the service of informing the list 
performed at the address in the phone book. It is as if the caller has ma 
i trip to the location of the listener and has made the presentation in the 
>sence of the listener. Because the distance between them has been "shrunk 
ictmnically, the time required for this electronic visit to the home of a 
>spect is infinitismal. Thus, it is possible for a single solicitor to be 
ird in the homes of many persons within a single day. None of the receivers 
located or situated at the callerfs location, and yet the solicitation 
accomplished at distributed points around the city. These distributed 
nts cannot be inside the place of business, or the place of business would 
e to be exapnded geographically to include all the phone lines and instrume 
the valley—and beyond—which could be interconnected. 
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The l!B!l test is, therefore, inadequate to address the possibility 
.he telephonic or electronic exchange. Since it is inadequate, the flB!l 
cannot be sufficient. Since it is insufficient, and yet is necessary 
iescribe the independent contractor, the independent contractor cannot be 
Lned by thehAct. Therefore, Mr. Rousay cannot be shown to be NOT to be 
)ciated with an independent contractor. 
To further complicate the f,Blf test, one might appropriately 
ime that eventhough the telephonic transaction takes place in some location 
:h is difficult to define, the cash transaction which results is clearly in 
location only—the home of the recipient. The consumation of the agreement 
i a donation actually takes place on the doorstep of the donor, as a direct 
ilt of the call he or she accepted at the specified address. Therefore the 
sumation of the solicitors efforts takes place in a physical setting remove 
n the callerfs location. The business actually takes place, therefore, out* 
business address. 
Finally, if the Court were to allow Mr. Siler to dictate the 
ms of a contract by a subsequent action (filing for unemployment benefits), 
nthough the clear intent is to avoid such relationships, and the representa 
the part of Mr. Siler were to avoid such a relationship, then the State is 
iarly placing more power and authority in the hands of Mr. Siler. Since Mr. 
.er would be given overpowering control over the terms of the relationship, 
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Ld the Court not make Mr. Siler the master in this relationship? Is not 
unitary and sole authority to define the very nature of a relationship 
ultimate form of control and direction? 
Yet, according to Section 35-4-18(a), of the Act, it is 
ossible for anyone who wishes to LATER declare himself to be a worker 
waive any rights to unemployment insurance benefits by signing an independe 
tractor agreement. To put it another way, the worker has total control and 
ection over who shall be held responsible for the unemployment benefits, 
s seems to create a situation where the first to declare himself to be an 
loyee of the other has total and complete control over the definition of 
relationship. 
This, of course is absurd, because one cannot be both in complet 
.trol and directed and controlled, unless one does so by submission. For b] 
•mitting, one takes ultimate control. Since it is impossible to be a servai 
[ master at the same time, the "A" test is meaningless in light of Section 
•4-18 (a). 
In the instant case, by merely alleging himself to be an employ* 
Siler has submitted Mr. Rousay to hundreds of hours of research and labor 
:end himself against vague charges of the Employment Security Division wi 
wing what is at stake. In this case the Claimant is clearly the master of 
lintiff. Therefore, the ruling of the Commission should be set aside in th 
:erest of justice.
 {r% 
In the instant case, Mr. SilerTs calls were originated on a leased 
me from a borrowed office, or on his home phone. In either case, the 
:ipient of the call was always at home. In a limited number of cases, Mr. 
Ler performed only the telephone solicitation, in most cases he did both, or 
Ly the delivery and collection. In all cases, of course, the delivery and 
Llection was accomplished at the donor!s home, or mailed from that location. 
some instances, Mr. Siler took delivery of contributions at his home. Some 
these were by mail. Since these activities routinely took place outside 
3 office of Mr. Rousay, and since some of these activities took place outsic 
Mr. Silerfs home work site, the instant case clearly meets the !fBn test— 
n^ with the nBf! testfs inadequacies to address directly the issues of 
Lecommunications. 
Issues pertaining to the MAM test have already been addressed in 
.ail in other arguments. However, the "A" portion of the test is also 
awed. One of the major flaws is that it does not allow for the conventiona] 
siness practice of business ventures in which entrepreneurs alternately 
ke turns as senders and receivers, talker and listener, leader and follower, 
ster and servaiit. 
In the instant case, Mr. Siler hired, and fired personnel. He 
red them for actions he found personally " intolerable". Mr. Siler, at 
time, alleged the firing was in accord with instructions of Mr. Rousay. 
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leed, the opposite was true. Mr. Rousay did not know of the incident at 
J time. Even had he known, he could not have concurred or contested since 
i personnel were of Mr. Siler's own unit. As already pointed out in earlie 
;uments, Mr. Siler exercised more authority and direction than Mr. Rousay 
this regard. While this may not appear to be significant at first glance, 
is abundantly clear that because of the relationships Mr. Siler enjoyed, 
cease soliciting, delivering and collecting was his own decision. 
In their arguments, the Commission cites the case of New Sleep, Ir 
partment of Employment Security. In New Sleep, the Commission ruled that 
orporation was liable for contriubutions to the Unemployment Compensation ] 
iview of the decision, the Court held that: (1) installers1 work fell under 
lefinition of "employment," and did not meet the ABC test, and that (2) 
:act tlit the installers did not consider themselves employees (and signed pa 
lat effect) was immaterial. 
In New Sleep, the installers performed the bed installation only 
the corporation which used them. To contact the installers, clients had tc 
act the corporation to reach them. They had no other business address, 
installers had no other clientele who used ther services other than those 
t directly with the corporation. Also, their function was a narrow one. 
did not perform as holders of inventory, or perform a sales function outs 
corporate offices. 
The Court held that the installers were free from control over 
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formance, but they were Mwithin New Sleep's course of business". However, 
was shown that New Sleep was in the business of selling, and installing wat< 
s. Yet, the installation process was conducted at the discretion of the 
all^er at a location outside the geographical confines of the business/ 
porate facilities. Eventhough the installation was to the customerTs 
cretion, and paid directly to the installer, the commitment to have the bed 
tailed had taken place on the property of the Corporation, and yet the Cour 
ed the B test was Mclearly met11. 
The Court held that the installers failed to meet the MCn test 
ause they were usually students—not installers. In contrast, the Court 
d in North American Builders that certain siding installers met the C test 
ause they were generally known to render such services to anyone. 
The instant case differs significantly from New Sleep on important 
>oints. In New Sleep, the installers performed work only for the corporatic 
Ir. Siler performed solicitation for Paramed and AWARE, and continued to mat 
leliveries for Ute Cab for about 30 days. Importantly, he declared himself 
:o understand that he was a free agent and could have performed other telepfc 
fork or delivery at any time since he was an independent contractor by pref€ 
ind in fact. 
In New Sleep, the installers had to be contacted through the corpc 
office. Mr. Siler not only could be contacted at his home, he was contactec 
:here as the envelope (Exhibit |3> F\) shows. Furthermore, his own work unit 
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iously contacted him there since he contracted flyer distribution there wit 
rsons other than his family. Ute Cab could reach him at his home, too. 
did business under his own name (See Chauffeur license, and telephone 
licitor!s license), which was listed at that time in the Salt Lake telephon 
rectory, and therefore could have been reached at his home by anyone who 
d his name. The Exhibit , proves at least some people had his home addre 
d reached him there for business purposes. 
In New Sleep, the installers were strictly involved in installatior 
the instant case, Mr. Siler was involved in a variety of functions, or mi> 
functions depending on the client. Mr. Siler, for example, did more delrv 
>r Paramed than Aware. In solicitation and in delivery, Mr. Siler had comp] 
.scretion over when and to whom such outreaches were made. Furthermore, he 
LS free to come and go as he chose and used the donated facilities as it 
lited him. He also rented a phone for a nominal fee and used it as he chose, 
:. Siler held the tickets at his own home (analogous to inventory warehousii 
id control), and performed routine administrative functions there such as 
ieping track of his calls, deliveries and receipts. 
E C TEST 
The Commission argues that the phone rental fee is immaterial, and 
e resources brought to the relationship do not consitute a "legitimate...st 
an independently established business. 
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The implication in this argument is that there is some minimum 
ltribution on the part of the indepdendent contractor. This implicatic 
hardly reasonable. In fact, such an argument might be used to restrain 
nmerce and business activity by imposing minimum levels of captial investmei 
fore one can be considered in business for themselves. 
Tt&e is some hint of a naieve impression that businesses beging 
th large endowments of capital, office space, phones, files, secretaries, 
d tools or equipment. This view is hardly supported by the ACT. The 
T requires no such distinction. The substance of the deals, rather 
th the process of trade, the processes of business, the process of 
nctioning. 
If we were to take the Commissions arguements at face value, it 
>uld be impossible to go into business, then without first having been in 
isiness. This presents an absurd paradox. Of course people can go into 
isiness with modest resources. The way they do it is by declaring themselve 
: repreenting themselves to be in business for themselves, usually, they 
) this by verbal and written declarations of their intent. Mr. Siler 
iclared his intent, and after having done so, repeatedly reinforced this 
^presentation by signing a statement that he understood himself to be 
id represented himself to be an independnet contractor. He confirmed this 
ie$/ in cross examination. 
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In it's conclusions, the Commission cited New Sleep vs Utah 
artment of Employment Security. In New Sleep, the court found that the 
viduals deliverying waterbeds were not established in the delivery business 
therefore, performed their delivery service in employment. Though there 
many fundamental differences between New Sleep and the instant case, the 
mission argued that Mr. Siler performed his delivery servics in the 
loyment of the plaintiff, because Siler did not establish himself to be 
the delivery business. Arguing that Mr. Siler was not in an independent, 
:ablished trade, he could not meet the C test and would therefore fall 
:hin the parameters of employee. 
One of the obvious distinctions between New Sleep and 
a instant case is that the deliverymen for New Sleep did not indicate they 
eferred an independent relationship before accepting a contract relationshi 
reover, the deliverymen did not hire and fire others as an employing unit 
Mr. Siler did. Finally, the delivery of furniture is a much more capital-
tensive business than delivering of tickets. A furniture delivery firm 
.ght require access to a large delivery vehicle, hand trucks and specialized 
[uipment, while the delivery of tickets might require nothing more than a 
[cycle and a pencil* and access to a telephone, perhaps. 
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The Commission argues that the phone rental fee is immaterial 
d that the resources brought to the relationship by Mr. Siler do not 
institute a "legitimate. .. showing11 as an independently established business. 
The argument that there is some minimum contribution on the 
Lrt of the independent contractor has some merit. However, what is a 
igitimate showing would depend on the nature and type of business. As 
.ready noted, what is minimal for a furniture mover may be greatly excessive 
)r a ticket deliveryman. Conversely what would be a minimal investment for 
ticket deliveryman would be woefully inadequate for a furniture mover. 
In New Sleep the Court ruled that the "A" and "B" portions of the 
est were met by the installers. It is apparent that the Plaintiff!s point; 
.n the instant case are even stronger than those of the Plaintiff in New Sle 
'or example, eventhough the corporation arranged delivery and installation, 
.hose arrangements were usually made on the property of New Sleep Corporatio 
;he Court ruled that the "B!! test was l!clearly met11. 
In the instant case, Mr. Siler routinely made arrangements for 
Ielivery and collection himself. Moreover, he had the choice of doing it an 
Dlace he wanted. On occasion he did this from his own business location, hi 
lome. 
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In New Sleep, the Court held that installers failed to meet UC" 
cause they were students—not installers. Yet, in North American Builders, 
rtain siding installers met the "C" test because they were generally known 
render such services to anyone. As already mentioned, in the instant case 
. Siler not only solicited from his home he ADVERTIZED by use of flyers, 
terefore, by his own testimony, he promoted himself and his own side of 
ie venture independently of Mr. Rousay, AWARE, and the Paramed Foundation, 
renthough Mr. Siler was making an initial step as an entrepreneur ( and had 
D history, as such ) he clearly knew how to function as an independent 
itrepreneur and chose to function as such. In fact, in North American 
uilders, the siding installers appeared to be passive about promoting their 
ervices to others, and merely awaited calls. In the instant case, Mr. Sile 
CTIVELY promoted his services. Mr. Siler not only meets the flCn test, he 
oes so by a substantial margin. 
In summary, despite the weaknesses of the ABC test, and the problc 
:heir "conjunctiveness'1 cause, the instant case clearly meets the ABC test, 
lot only does the instant case meet the "A" and !IB!I portions, but meets and 
exceeds the criteria of the "C" test. Because Mr. Siler was clearly an 
.ndependent agent or contractor, and not an employee, as determined by the 
U3C test, the Commission?s ruling should be overturned. 
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MARY: 
The ruling of the Industrial Commission should be reversed and 
actions against Mr. Rousay dismissed. Not only was Mr. Siler self-
loyed, he functioned as an employer. Yet, the Industrial Commission, 
a completely arbitrary and capricious manner, has colluded with this 
.ligible applicant to harass Mr. Rousay. In effort to force Mr. Rousay 
pay unemployment benefits to the State. Employment Security Officials 
re systematically violated Mr. Rousay!s rights. Not only have these officia 
Igered Mr. Rousay for records before a determination of status was 
:omplished, they have done so without showing cause and have repeatedly 
:empted to coerce Mr. Rousay to testify against himself. State Officials 
re coached the only witness, colluded in preparing what appears to be a frau 
mt application, and broadened Siler's case (which is unique by almost 
f legal standard) to include other alleged (un-named employees). State 
Eicials continued to badger and harass Mr. Rousay by failing to provide 
equate notice of dates to permit him to file for appeals. This required 
. Rousay to apply eleven (11) times for reinstatement of his appeal! But 
e most flagrant violation of all is that at no time has Mr. Rousay been 
early informed of what was at stake, or why, precisely, the State subpoena* 
s records, demanded appearance, and forced him to undergo this strenuous, 
stly procedure. This is a clear violation of Mr. Rousayfs Constitutional 
ghts. When the State did present its argument that Mr. Rousay was an 
ployer, Mr. Rousay was denied the oppportunity to subpoena records and 
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ritnesses that could testify to the contrary, on Mr. Rousayfs behalf. 
Ironically, Mr. Rousay is being challenged for failure to meet the 
LBC Test of Section 34 of the Utah Code. Yet, the transcripts clearly show 
Ir. Rousay required Mr.Siler to declare himself as to preference before Mr, 
Jiler signed a statement waiving his rights as an employee, and in which Si] 
eclared himself to be self-employed and an independent contractor. Moreove 
.he evidence clearly shows that Mr. Rousay did not require time cards, hire, 
>r fire, or conduct training how to phone or solicit. Rather, he shows hims 
.o consistently refrain from activities that would suggest that Mr. Rousay 
iver wanted to be an employer, or functioed as an employer. 
In the final analysis, the unemployment benefits claimant meets mc 
)f the criteria of an employer than Mr. Rousay! Mr. Siler freely admits he 
lired and fired. Mr. Rousay has consistently and routinely avoided even th< 
appearance of an employer. Mr. Rousay has always, openly declared that he 
tfould not engage in a contract relationship with Mr. Siler unless he had th 
tools and equipment to function as an independent contractor, and was prope 
licensed under the laws and ordinances of the City of Salt Lake where he ch 
to function. To rule against Mr. Rousay would establish a shocking precede 
of setting aside contracts between two consenting adults, who by agreement 
mutually at risk, who declare themselves to be independent contractors, 
furthermore, the State would condone the violation of private businessmen, 
permit the harassment of individuals, and deny them Constitutional rights. 
The State would also stoop to coaching of witnesses, permit questionable 
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ments to be admitted as Exhibits. To permit all of this chicanery in a 
ration where the primary subject, Mr. Siler is, by the very criteria Mr. 
>ay is being measured by, an employer himself. To rule against Mr. Rousay 
Ld permit—even encourage the self-employed to file for benefits, and 
lin them, merely by declaring themselves to be employed, when they wish 
:erminate an agreement. 
Though State Officials would not allow Mr. Silerfs full record to 
subpoenaed, and other witnesses to testify on Mr. Rousayfs behalf, the 
iscripts clearly point that Mr. Siler was self-employed, even an employer, 
therefore could not be employed. Since he could not be unemployed, he 
never eligible for unemployment benefits. Since Siler was never eligible, 
se actions should have never been brought forward. 
The fact that they have, with such callous disregard for Mr, Rousay!s 
tits, clearly shows an attitude so arbitrary and capricious as to be dilerate 
assment. 
The conclusion of the Industrial Commisiion should reversed and all 
ions against Mr. Rousay should be dismissed immediately so that he can pursi 
emedy against those who have so brazenly wronged him. 
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